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GRIDLOCK  AND  SENATE  RULES
John C. Roberts*
INTRODUCTION
Our assignment in this symposium is to explore the role that legal issues
play in what is popularly known as “gridlock” in Washington.  I am tempted
to declare the symposium over by arguing that there are no such relevant
legal issues—that our problems are really political and ideological, not stem-
ming from any legal or constitutional deficiencies.  But that would be too
easy.  There are legal defects which contribute to our current frustration,
even if we may ultimately conclude that they are symptoms and not causes of
gridlock.
It is certainly true that the federal government is in a period of extreme
dysfunction.1  We see it in conflicts between the President and the Congress
over appointments and long range fiscal policy.  We especially see it in the
inability of the House and Senate to cooperate on urgently needed legislative
priorities.  Year after year, budget resolutions and appropriations bills are not
passed in a timely fashion, and often not at all.2  Measures dealing with major
public issues die in the Senate.3  I want to focus in this paper on one of the
most talked about elements of gridlock, the use of Senate rules and practices
 2013 John C. Roberts.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Dean and Professor of Law Emeritus, DePaul University College of Law.  A version
of this paper was delivered at the Notre Dame Law Symposium entitled “The American
Congress: The Legal Implications of Gridlock,” on November 16, 2012.  I am indebted to
Mark Giangrande of DePaul’s Rinn Law Library for research assistance on congressional
materials.  I first encountered these issues while serving as General Counsel to the United
States Senate Committee on Armed Services from 1977 to 1980, where I benefited greatly
from the advice and guidance of both the Senate Office of Legislative Counsel and the
Office of the Parlimentarian.
1 See, e.g., THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS
(2012) (characterizing the landscape as containing ideologically polarized parties, includ-
ing the ideological outliers in the Republican party).
2 See Rebecca M. Kysar, Reconciling Congress, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ___ (2013).
3 In the 111th Congress only thirty-six percent of House-passed bills also passed the
Senate, while sixty-seven percent of Senate-passed bills passed the House.  Gregory Koger,
Filibustering and Partisanship in the Modern Senate, in PARTY AND PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS 217, 224 (Jacob R. Straus ed. 2011).  Professor Teter in his Symposium
contribution has noted that recent Congresses have passed far fewer bills overall than in
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by the minority to block virtually any action unless it is supported by sixty
senators.  In the public discourse about paralysis in Washington, dysfunction
in the Senate may be the most frequently cited cause.  Some commentators
have even suggested that the Senate now operates as a “vetocracy,”4 and
others like Mann and Ornstein have observed that changes in the Republican
Party have brought about a laser-like focus on obstruction rather than coop-
eration on legislation.5
This is not the place for a deep analysis of the underlying causes of our
political dysfunction.  But there is agreement on some points.  Rarely in our
history have the two parties been more polarized.6  In the Republican Party,
zealots have eliminated the traditional moderate-to-liberal legislators,7 and to
a lesser extent the Democratic Party is also more homogeneous.8  As a result,
as a striking chart in Mann and Ornstein’s recent book shows, there is no
ideological overlap between the parties in the Senate—the most liberal
Republican is still more conservative than the most conservative Democrat.9
As Gregory Wawro and Eric Schickler have observed, party lines today corre-
spond to policy preferences and ideology more tightly than at other times in
our history.10  Compromise across the aisle is virtually never obtained.  Proce-
dural holds by individual senators have proliferated on both legislation and
nominations.  The use or threatened use of the filibuster—extended debate
used to block Senate action—has become commonplace, resulting in what is
in effect a supermajority voting requirement for any legislative business.  We
can now see that convulsive events like the civil rights movement, the rise of
the religious right, and the “Gingrich revolution” of the 1990s have polarized
the parties and reshuffled the voters, eliminating the kind of bipartisan coop-
eration we saw in the 1950s and 1970s.  Perhaps more importantly, this
realignment has been accompanied by a new rhetoric, illustrated by the “Tea
Party” faction of the Republican Party, that characterizes the other party as
not just misguided but evil and immoral.11  Since legislating is difficult under
the past.  Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ___ (2013).
4 E.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Down with Everything, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012,
at SR11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/opinion/sunday/friedman-
down-with-everything.html.
5 MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 51–58; see Steven S. Smith, The Senate Syndrome, R
in THE U.S. SENATE 132, 139–41 (Burdett A. Loomis ed. 2012).
6 See David W. Rohde, Looking Back to See Ahead: The Senate in the Twenty-First Century,
in THE U.S. SENATE, supra note 5, at 239, 239–55. R
7 MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 45. R
8 Id.
9 Id. at 45.
10 Gregory J. Wawro & Eric Schickler, Legislative Obstructionism, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
297, 315 (2010) (“With party lines now corresponding to policy preferences (and ideologi-
cal groupings) more tightly than in much of American history, the filibuster has become
more clearly identified as a key tool of the minority party rather than as a tool used by
various types of minorities.”).
11 See, e.g., Lloyd Marcus, Evil Democrat Paradigms, AM. THINKER (Sept. 12, 2010), http:/
/www.americanthinker.com/2010/09/evil_democrat_paradigms.html (“Here are two par-
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the best of circumstances, portraying opponents in this Manichean way, and
viewing the policy process as a struggle between good and evil, can have dev-
astating effects.  Washington now seems unable to deal with the pressing
legal, economic and social issues facing the country in the twenty-first
century.
Solving the larger problem of hyper-partisanship and good versus evil
rhetoric is not part of my agenda, however.  The more limited issue before us
is whether there are changes in laws or congressional procedures which can
ease governmental gridlock and make it more likely that important policy
issues can be addressed successfully.  My focus is on the United States Senate,
and more particularly on the Senate’s unusual rules and traditions which
cluster around the right of extended debate.  Many critics see this aspect of
the Senate, resulting in a sixty vote requirement for any meaningful action, as
the crucial element in what we call gridlock.  They point to the large increase
in the use or threat of filibusters in recent years, and the routine filing of
cloture motions, as evidence of a crisis in the Senate.12  They decry the proce-
dural arms race that has resulted, as the majority resorts to parliamentary
tools designed to curtail minority rights, like early cloture filing and filling
the amendment tree.13  Even though I contend that the abuse of the legisla-
tive hold and the right of extended debate are merely symptoms of gridlock,
not causes, I propose to analyze these issues from a legal perspective and ask
whether anything can and should be done to make the Senate more
functional.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I take as my text for this paper congressional scholar Steven Smith’s
insightful use of the term “procedural fragility” to describe the Senate’s par-
liamentary culture.14  The Senate is procedurally fragile in the sense that the
body’s special traditions of extreme individualism, deference to other mem-
bers and procedural looseness make it especially vulnerable to members who
would take advantage of (some say abuse) the opportunities for obstruction
thus created.  The Senate has sometimes in the past operated on a coopera-
tive basis, across party lines, but the political polarization and demonization
of opponents’ ideas we see today can be fatal in a body like the Senate whose
rules and traditions allow for and even invite obstruction.
Many critics argue that the only solution for the Senate’s woes is to
enforce a strict regime of majority rule, under which a simple majority’s pol-
icy preferences must always prevail.  This goal of pure majoritarianism, how-
ever, is fanciful.  We must remember that the Senate itself is anti-majoritarian
by design.  Since each state has two senators, bills can and often do pass with
adigms which evil, divisive Democrats have shamefully promoted and exploited for years
. . . .”).
12 See, e.g., MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3–30; Smith, supra note 5, at 136–37. R
13 Smith, supra note 5, at 139–51. R
14 Id. at 132.
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the support of members representing a small minority of the nation’s voters.
Moreover, the Senate’s enactment process, like that of most legislative bod-
ies, includes numerous bottlenecks that may prevent a majority from bring-
ing a bill to the floor for a vote—leadership authority, respect for committee
autonomy, and the unrepresentativeness of committee membership, to name
only a few.  The tradition of extended debate and the hold are merely the
most prominent of these obstacles, but they are the most difficult for the
majority to overcome.
I argue that the Constitution demands something much more
profound—ultimate majority control.  By that I mean the power of a simple
majority of members present to adopt or amend rules governing the day-to-
day business of the Senate at any time.  Under this principle, the filibuster
itself is not unconstitutional if a majority of senators wish to allow it for insti-
tutional reasons.  Nor are supermajority voting rules themselves unconstitu-
tional, because the majority may find them useful to ensure consensus on
certain kinds of issues.  The same is true for all of the other procedural obsta-
cles, like a sticky committee system and the prerogatives of the majority
leader.  So long as a simple majority may decide at any time to amend or
repeal such rules or informal practices, the Constitution is not violated.  Even
if the so-called “constitutional option” to end debate on a rules change by
majority vote is exercised, as I advocate, it seems clear that the Senate would
probably continue to operate under some of its current rules, such as the
Cloture Rule (Rule XXII), and would continue to tolerate certain kinds of
holds and extended debate.  But at least under the principle of ultimate
majority control, members would have the power to modernize these rules
and traditions to reduce their minority veto effect and thus make the Senate
a more functional legislative body.  It would be, in other words, less proce-
durally fragile.  It would be able to counter more effectively the unreasoning
obstructionism that has become commonplace.  I will consider what some of
these changes might be later on.  Most important, the clear establishment in
Senate rules and procedures of the principle of ultimate majority control
would constrain the minority from abusing its prerogatives because of the
ever present threat that the majority would further curtail them.
Under my analysis, then, there is only one provision of the Senate’s cur-
rent Standing Rules that offends legal norms, and that is the language of
Rule XXII which requires a vote of two-thirds of members present and voting
to end debate on a motion to amend those same Rules.15  If the majority
could establish its authority under the Constitution to change Senate rules at
any time, some of the minority veto features of the modern Senate could be
eliminated or modified.  Gridlock might not be eliminated completely—
since its roots are not legal or constitutional but rather political and ideologi-
cal—but at least the Senate would be better armed to resist the worst abuses
we see today.
15 SENATE RULE XXII, UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 110-9, available at http://
www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXXII.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The roots of today’s sixty vote Senate lie in its structure, traditions and
culture.16  The Framers viewed the two houses of Congress as having very
different functions, and they developed very different cultures.  The House,
with younger members elected every two years, was intended to reflect the
views of the people more directly, and to be an active legislative body.17  The
Senate, elected by state legislatures and representing the states, was designed
as a small elite chamber, with longer terms of office staggered for stability.18
It would function much like a more experienced older brother to the ram-
bunctious House of Representatives, dampening the policy excesses of the
other body.  In its early years the Senate met in secret and did not originate
much legislation.19  Then, as now, the Senate was viewed as the more prestig-
ious body, and senators were usually the most experienced political leaders
of the states, who knew each other well.  The early Senate was quite small,
and remained so for much of the nineteenth century.
From the outset the Senate developed an unusual culture, reflecting its
small size and special function.  A sense of the intimacy of the early Senate
can be gained from viewing the Old Senate Chamber in the Capital.  The
entire membership could meet comfortably in a small dining room.20  Since
it had a limited agenda, the Senate could afford to operate far more infor-
mally than the House.21  It had a very brief set of procedural rules, and from
the beginning often waived or ignored the ones it had.  Instead senators
relied on their personal relationships with one another, and a strong defer-
ence to the needs and desires of each member.  There was a patrician sense
of courtesy and institutional pride, and over time the Senate’s precedents
and traditions were a strong force for stability.  The atmosphere was that of
an exclusive private club.  Several parliamentary traditions emerged in the
Senate but were rejected in the House because of its larger size and greater
workload.  These included the right of each senator to be recognized by the
16 An excellent account of the Senate’s early years can be found in ROBERT A. CARO,
THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON 3–105 (2002).  For my own discussion of the Senate’s cul-
ture, see John C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress: Further Notes on the Constitutionality of
the Senate Cloture Rule, 22 J. L. & POL. 505, 508–13 (2004).
17 THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison),
(WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) [hereinafter MADISON].
18 Madison wrote two of the Federalist essays, Numbers. 62 and 63, on the nature and
functions of the Senate, noting that when some unwise policy is proposed “how salutary
will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to
check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow mediated by the people against
themselves, until reason, justice, and truth, can regain their authority over the public
mind?” MADISON, supra note 17, at 347 (THE FEDERALIST NO. 63). R
19 The Senate 1789–1815, U.S. CAPITOL VISITOR CENTER, http://www.visitthecapitol.
gov/Exhibitions/online/1789-to-1815/senate-1789-1815.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
20 See STEPHEN G. CHRISTIANSON, FACTS ABOUT THE CONGRESS 1 (1996).  The first Sen-
ate was comprised of only twenty-six seats representing the thirteen original states. Id.
21 Senate Legislative Process, UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/
common/briefing/Senate_legislative_process.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
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Chair before a vote was taken, a powerful tool since modified by the Majority
Leader’s right of preferential recognition.22  Senators also had the right to
introduce unlimited numbers of amendments, and there was no germane-
ness rule for either debate or amendments.23  These unusually loose proce-
dures drastically limited the majority’s agenda control, since the minority
could always introduce their amendments and could bypass committees by
introducing entirely new bills as amendments to unrelated legislation.  Later,
the Senate was also characterized by a strong seniority system and a tradition
of apprenticeship, under which new members deferred to their elders on
both substance and procedure.  In its routine daily work, the modern Senate
often waives or modifies many of its Standing Rules and traditions, relying
heavily on unanimous consent agreements to control the sequence of votes
and amendments leading to passage of a measure.
Congressional scholars agree that the filibuster—the right of extended
debate to obstruct action—did not exist in the early Senate.24  At the begin-
ning, its Standing Rules included a motion for the previous question, which
could be employed to end debate and bring a matter to a vote.  It was little
used and was deleted from the Rules at the suggestion of Vice President Burr
during a revision of the rules in 1806.25  From that time until 1917 there was
no parliamentary device to end debate in the Senate.  One might wonder
how the Senate ever voted on controversial measures in the absence of a
formal means to end debate.  The answer, of course, lies in the Senate’s cul-
ture and traditions.  Throughout the nineteenth century, members occasion-
ally engaged in extended debate, but rarely for purposes of simple
obstruction.  Given its small size and relatively light workload, the body could
afford to wait out the minority and a vote was eventually taken.26  The first
real filibuster for purposes of obstruction did not occur until the 1820s.27
Gregory Koger, using contemporary newspaper accounts, traces the break-
down of this informal system to the convulsive period from 1870 to 1917,
when Congress’s workload increased dramatically and partisan divisions were
intense.28  Coupled with many additional senators from new states, these fac-
22 RULE XIX, UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 106-15, available at http://
www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXIX; see FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S.
FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES, S. DOC. NO. 101-28, at
1091–1105 (Alan S. Frumin ed. ., 1992) [hereinafter RIDDICK].
23 RIDDICK, supra note 22, at 62–63, 854–62. R
24 During the 2011 debate over hold reform, nine prominent congressional scholars
submitted a joint letter making this and related historical points.  157 CONG. REC. S317
(daily ed. Jan. 27, 2011) (letter from nine scholars); see SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S.
SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE?  47–51 (1997).
25 157 CONG. REC. S317 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2011) (letter from nine scholars).
26 See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 24, at 39. R
27 CARO, supra note 16, at 92 (describing how Senator Randolph, in 1825, used the R
filibuster to prevent votes on many industrial measures which he viewed favored the
North); see also GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING 147–87 (2010) (describing the history and
development of the filibuster).
28 KROGER, supra note 27, at 147–87. R
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tors vastly increased the importance of members’ time and made the filibus-
ter a much more dangerous parliamentary weapon.  Scholars have noted that
the Cloture Rule was little used in the decades after its adoption in 1917,
however, illustrating the continuing power of the Senate’s cooperative cul-
ture.29  There was actually more obstruction in the House in the nineteenth
century, though it usually took the form of dilatory motions and failures to
answer during quorum calls.30  Changes pushed through by House Speaker
Reed in the 1890s brought about the strict majority rule institution we see
today.31
Throughout the Senate’s history, there has been an often tenuous bal-
ance between the right of individual senators to exploit its traditions of
extended debate and unlimited amendments, and the powerful traditions of
cooperation, deference to leaders and institutional loyalty.  Restraint in the
use of obstructive practices arose from recognition of the Senate’s procedu-
ral fragility—every senator realized that under its loose rules chaos would
result if each senator fully exploited his rights, and that each senator’s own
pet bills were vulnerable to reciprocal obstruction.  Between 1917 and 1960
filibusters were rare and by common assent reserved for extremely important
measures.32  The unspoken pact counseling restraint started to break down
in the 1960s, when Southern conservatives filibustered civil rights legislation
and Northern liberals began to realize that extended debate could be used
on their issues as well.33  Many scholars mark the end of this “old-fashioned”
Senate to the election of 1980, when Republicans took control and partisan
polarization became more evident.34  Full-blown obstruction was much more
common starting in 1992.  But the system had actually begun to break down
after the 1970s reforms that reduced the power of seniority and encouraged
members to challenge entrenched authority in the Senate.35  My own experi-
ence in the late 1970s as General Counsel for a major Senate committee was
that the traditional culture was starting to deteriorate.  Senators sometimes
29 See Richard S. Beth, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Associ-
ation, Portland, Or.: What We Don’t Know About Filibusters 14–17 (March 15–18, 1995), availa-
ble at http://www.netrootsmass.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/documents/crs/
1995-Beth-What-We-Dont-Know-About-Filibusters-ocr150.pdf; see also SENATE COMM. ON
RULES & ADMIN., 112TH CONG., SENATE CLOTURE RULE: LIMITATION OF DEBATE IN THE SEN-
ATE OF THE UNITED STATES AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF RULE XXII OF THE
STANDING RULES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (CLOTURE RULE), S. Prt. 112-31 (Comm.
Print 2011) 46–48 [hereinafter SENATE CLOTURE RULE].
30 Beth, supra note 29, at 14. R
31 See KOGER, supra note 27, at 53–57. R
32 See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 24, at 85–86. R
33 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?  Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil
Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 621 (1991).
34 See generally LEWIS L. GOULD, THE MOST EXCLUSIVE CLUB 277–93 (2005) (describing
1980 as the start of “A Ruder Senate”); IRA SHAPIRO, THE LAST GREAT SENATE (2012) (pro-
viding a historical account of the character and actions of the Senate in the 1960s through
the 1980s).
35 Smith, supra note 5, at 136–37. R
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ignored unwritten rules like informing committee chairs in advance of
amendments, and refusal to agree to unanimous consent agreements
became more common.  Under my Chairman, John Stennis, the Armed Ser-
vices Committee operated with a single staff serving both parties and
observed the traditions of courtesy and individual rights that had long held
sway.  After the 1980 election brought a Republican majority, Senator John
Tower became Chairman, the staff was split, and the atmosphere became
much more partisan.  Ira Shapiro, in his recent book, thus marks 1980 as the
end of the “Last Great Senate” and of the norm of bipartisan cooperation.
Not only have we seen a large increase in the threat of filibusters in the
modern era, and a corresponding use of cloture as a commonly used major-
ity tactic, but the abusive use of the legislative “hold” has also emerged.36
There had long been a tradition, rooted in the Senate’s respect for each
member’s rights, of accommodating the request of a senator on the floor to
delay a measure briefly for further study or consultation with its sponsor.37
Since agenda control was far less centralized, it made sense for the majority
to accede to such requests.  Sometime in the 1970s, however, this practice
changed into something entirely different.  The request to delay considera-
tion of a bill or a nomination was often communicated to the leaders in
secret, and the hold carried no time limit.38  Furthermore, holds lost their
legitimate focus on the substance of legislation and were increasingly used to
retaliate against another senator, extort concessions from the leaders on
other bills, or even to force specific actions by the executive branch.39  More-
over, holds were sometimes entered against large numbers of the bills or
nominations at the same time.  Since the hold was increasingly interpreted as
a threat to withhold unanimous consent to proceed to a measure, it operated
as a stealth filibuster, but without the need to debate the question or even
reveal the identity of the obstructing member.  Though the system was
entirely voluntary and not set out in Senate Rules, the vast increase in the use
of holds has been a lightning rod for criticism, which has been correctly
joined with criticism of the filibuster generally.40
With this brief review of the history and culture of the Senate, the ques-
tion is then posed: Can the Senate afford to continue with its traditions of
extended debate, deference to desires of individual members, and loose par-
liamentary rules in a period of crushing national problems, hyper-partisan-
ship, and lack of cooperation between parties?  Or must it recognize that its
old ways of doing business simply cannot continue in a period of partisan
gridlock, when the minority is often willing to stand together to block any
36 See WALTER J. OLESZEK, PROPOSALS TO REFORM “HOLDS” IN THE SENATE, CONG. RES.
SERV. 1 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31685.pdf; Alexandra
Arney, Recent Development, The Secret Holds Elimination Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 271
(2011) (discussing the impact of anonymous holds on the Senate).
37 See OLESZEK, supra note 36, at 1. R
38 See generally id. (describing proposed limits).
39 Id.at 1–2.
40 See Smith, supra note 5, at 133, 146–48. R
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action desired by the majority or the President?  The House followed a simi-
lar road, as Koger has noted—obstruction was first possible but rare, then
became commonplace, raising the costs to the body.41  Finally, in the 1890s,
the situation became intolerable and the Reed Rules tightened majority con-
trol.42  Can the Senate become more of a majority rule body, like the House,
but without losing its unique character and the special role it has played in
our legislative system?  If change is to come about, its proponents must first
confront the procedural hurdle of Rule XXII, which requires that two-thirds
of those present and voting agree in order to end debate on a change in the
Standing Rules.
THE LEGAL CASE FOR CONTINUING MAJORITY CONTROL
If the Senate is to do as I suggest and reassert ultimate majority control
over its rules, that historic step must be seen by the country at large as legiti-
mate.  Only then can the majority make the necessary changes today and
maintain a credible threat to adopt further changes in the future if the right
of extended debate is abused.  Supporters of Rule XXII’s rule entrenchment
always argue that the assertion of majority control would be an unprece-
dented step and a violation of core constitutional principles.  My contention
is that the opposite is true—entrenched supermajority rules are an anomaly
in the Senate’s tradition and inconsistent with both the letter of the Constitu-
tion and larger principles of representative self-government.  In making that
case, I rest on three arguments: the primacy of simple majority rule in our
representative system; the explicit constitutional power granted by the
Rulemaking Clause of Article I, Section V; and the generally accepted anti-
entrenchment principle that one Congress may not bind a future Congress.43
At one level, the argument for ultimate majority control should be non-
controversial.  After all, the traditional Robert’s Rules structure—that so long
as a quorum exists a simple majority of those present decides disputed ques-
tions—is followed just about universally in American society.  In every com-
munity book club, college faculty, or city council, it is assumed that a simple
majority prevails and that the majority has the power to adopt or change its
procedural rules.  Viewed in that way, the rule entrenchment of Rule XXII is
simply inconsistent with our Western traditions of normal legislative behav-
ior.  I have seen no evidence that supermajority control over rules existed in
any other American legislative bodies in the eighteenth century or later.
More important, there is compelling evidence that those who wrote our Con-
stitution believed in simple majority rule for ordinary legislation.  The Fram-
ers adopted several supermajority rules for actions like impeachment44 and
41 See KROGER, supra note 27, at 78–95 (detailing the emergence of obstruction in R
both the Senate and House).
42 Id.
43 I have made these arguments elsewhere in greater detail. See Roberts, supra note
16, at 520–47. R
44 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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veto overrides45 that involved checks and balances between the branches and
for especially important matters like expulsion of a member.46  But they
debated and rejected two proposals that would have required supermajority
votes for specific types of legislation—navigation and interstate commerce—
strongly suggesting that otherwise majority rule is the norm.47  All the major
intellectual leaders of the founding group explicitly endorsed majority con-
trol as an underlying principle of the legislative branch.  These included
James Madison,48 the chief architect of the Constitution, and Thomas Jeffer-
son,49 author of the definitive work on American parliamentary practice still
in use today.  Moreover, their letters and other writings show a strong aver-
sion to supermajority rules for ordinary legislative business.  Madison in par-
ticular repeatedly pointed to supermajority rules in the Articles of
Confederation as an important source of deadlock in the Confederation
Congress and a compelling reason for a new constitutional system.50  I am
convinced by these explicit statements, and by negative implication from the
specific addition of a few supermajority rules, that the Framers intended the
majority to control in other instances.  Indeed, that argument can be made
about the Rulemaking Clause of Article I, Section 5, itself, since the state-
ment of each House’s power over its rules is separated only by a comma from
the requirement that two-thirds concurrence is required to expel a mem-
ber.51  On the familiar principle of expressio unius we can infer that the Con-
stitution contains an underlying idea that on other matters where the voting
requirement is not specified the majority should control the outcome.52  The
Supreme Court relied on just such reasoning in Powell v. McCormack53 and
U.S. Term Limit, Inc. v. Thornton54 to hold that the Constitution’s listing of
45 Id. art. I, § 7.
46 Id. art. I, § 5.
47 See II THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 444, 452–53 (interstate
commerce), 394–95, 449–53 (navigation) (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter
FARRAND].
48 E.g., MADISON, supra note 17, at 336–37 (THE FEDERALIST NO. 58). R
49 E.g., CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES (1797), H. R. DOC. NO. 107-284, at 266 (2003).
50 I FARRAND, supra note 47, at 497 (Madison); II FARRAND, supra note 47, at 450 (Sher- R
man).  Hamilton made the point forcefully in The Federalist Papers.  1 DEBATES ON THE
CONSTITUTION 510 (THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton)) (Bernard Bailyn ed.,
1993). See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 24, at 51 (“The delegates at the Constitutional R
Convention knew full well from their experiences in the Continental Congress that requir-
ing supermajorities was a recipe for stalemate and indecision.”).
51 U.S. CONST. art I, § 5.
52 Expressio unius est exlusio alterius—the express inclusion of one or more things
implies the exclusion of other things from similar treatment. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009).  Fear that this canon might be applied led to the inclusion of
the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution. See Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning
of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1227–38 (1990).
53 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
54 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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specific qualifications for congressmen and senators implied that no other
qualifications could be imposed.55
Supporters of Rule XXII would have us believe that extended debate
which cannot be ended by majority vote has been with us throughout the
history of the Senate, but such is not the case.  It is certain, for example, that
extended debate outside of majority control was not a feature of the original
Senate.56  As we have seen, the early Senate operated under procedures by
which a majority could force a vote by the non-debatable motion for the pre-
vious question,57 a motion present in Robert’s Rules and used almost univer-
sally today in committees and bodies of all kinds.  No one suggested during
the debate over eliminating the rule in 1806 that doing so would eliminate
the majority’s right to end debate and vote, and no one contended that a
supermajority vote was necessary to change the rules.  If a simple majority of
the Senate possessed the unfettered power to change its rules in 1806, we
might well ask how it could lose that power later on.  As congressional schol-
ars Gregory Wawro and Eric Schickler have persuasively argued, majority
control was in fact alive and well during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.  They show that when extended debate became too abusive, the
majority retained control either by obtaining modifications of Senate prac-
tices through sympathetic rulings from the Chair, or by implicit threats to
exert its power to change the rules.58  When extended debate finally
morphed into blind obstruction, a cloture rule was adopted for the first time
in 1917,59 which may have had the perverse effect of enshrining the notion
of supermajority rules in the Senate for the first time.  Though the vote was
overwhelming, no one argued in 1917 that a supermajority vote was necessary
to adopt the cloture rule.  Again, if the Senate had the power to change its
rules by majority vote in 1917, when and how did it lose that power?
In the modern era, while giving lip service to the requirement that end-
ing debate on a change in the Standing Rules of the Senate requires a two-
thirds vote, the Senate has in fact enacted a number of statutes that prohibit
filibusters for specific types of legislative action.  The most significant of these
provisions is the reconciliation process contained in the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974,60 but there are many others.61  The Senate takes the odd
position that these types of provisions are not explicitly amendments to the
55 Id. at 783 (“Such a state-imposed restriction is contrary to the ‘fundamental princi-
ple of our representative democracy,’ embodied in the Constitution . . . . Allowing individ-
ual States to adopt their own qualifications for congressional service would be inconsistent
with the Framers’ vision . . . .” (citing Powell, 395 U.S. at 547) (internal citations omitted)).
56 See Emmet J. Bondurant, The Senate Filibuster: The Politics of Obstruction, 48 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 467, 468 (2011).
57 See id.
58 GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER 65–87 (2006).
59 Bondurant, supra note 56, at 473. R
60 Pub. L. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.
(2006)).
61 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statues to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separa-
tion of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J. L. & POL. 345, 345–47 (2003); Charles
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Standing Rules and therefore may pass without the two-thirds requirement
being met.62  It is clear to all, however, that these kinds of provisions are in
fact modifications of Rule XXII.  The political danger that the reconciliation
process could lead to a broader undermining of the rule was a motivating
factor in the adoption of the Byrd Rule in 1985, which limited it to deficit-
reducing provisions.63  These statutes, and the Senate’s frequent resort to
them, are significant because they demonstrate the underlying vitality of ulti-
mate majority control.  A final proof of that point is the action of the Senate
in 1975 to modify the Cloture Rule.  In that convoluted parliamentary battle,
the Senate voted three times to sustain Chair rulings that a majority of the
body could change its rules, despite Rule XXII.  For political reasons, the
Senate a few days later reversed those votes and reasserted the power of Rule
XXII, but commentators then and since have recognized that in fact the prin-
ciple of majority control had been demonstrated.64
In addition to rules statutes that limit filibusters, the Senate has also
made procedural changes throughout its history by use of sympathetic chair
rulings backed by a majority vote to table appeals of those rulings.  Commen-
tators have demonstrated convincingly that numerous changes have been
made by simple majorities using this method (and occasionally by adopting
Standing Orders with precedential value), even in the modern era when the
Standing Rules are supposedly protected against majority change by Rule
XXII.65  The Senate has simply continued the fiction that these types of prec-
edential rulings, sometimes on significant parliamentary issues, are not the
same as changes in the Standing Rules.  As one scholar has noted, they don’t
change the rules, but rather change the meaning of the rules.66  Once again,
this tradition demonstrates that simple majority rule is a consistent underly-
ing principle throughout the Senate’s history.
Because they recognize that the filibuster is in fact a powerful tool of
obstruction, members from both parties in the modern Senate have been
Tiefer, How to Steal a Trillion: The Uses of Laws About Lawmaking in 2001, 17 J.L. & POL. 409,
435–41 (2001).
62 RIDDICK, supra note 22, at 1224; see CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS ET AL., PROPOSALS TO R
CHANGE THE OPERATION OF CLOTURE IN THE SENATE, CONG. RES. SERV. 18 (2010), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41342.pdf.
63 BILL HENIFF, JR., THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS: THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE”,
CONG. RES. SERV. 2 (2010), available at http://democrats.budget.house.gov/sites/demo-
crats.budget.house.gov/files/documents/reconciliation.pdf.
64 See 121 CONG. REC. 5243, 5249 (1975) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd); 2 ROBERT C.
BYRD, THE SENATE, 1789–1989, S. DOC. NO. 100-20, at 131–33 (1991); CHARLES TIEFER,
CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 705 (1989) (“Although there had been a face-
saving solution, the Rubicon had been crossed.”).
65 See, e.g., Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to Change Senate
Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Overcome the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 205, 363–68 (2005); Gregory Koger, Filibuster and Majority Rule in the Senate: The Con-
test over Judicial Nominations, 2003–2005, in WHY NOT PARTIES? 159, 160–63 (Nathan W.
Monroe et al. eds., 2008).
66 Koger, supra note 65, at 160. R
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL507.txt unknown Seq: 13  2-JUL-13 12:21
2013] gridlock  and  senate  rules 2201
unwilling to impose tight control over debate.  Understandably, they are
reluctant to eliminate one of the unique features of the body that confers on
each of them such prestige and leverage.  That ambivalence, even hypocrisy,
exists today, as many senators advocate change only when they are in a frus-
trated majority.67  Ultimate majority control has always had its strong advo-
cates, however.  Prominent senators have supported the constitutional option
over the years, and, throughout the later twentieth century battles over this
issue erupted regularly at the start of a new Congress.68  Three Vice Presi-
dents have expressly supported the principle of majority control over rules
from the Chair.69  Indeed, several historians of the Senate have concluded
that each time the Senate has adopted modifications of its debate rules, in
1917, 1949, 1959, 1975 and 1979, it did so under the threat that reformers
would succeed in exercising the constitutional option.70  And of course in
1975 they did succeed  despite ultimately agreeing to a questionable
compromise.71
Despite the power of general majority rule principles, however, in order
for the Senate to establish with clarity and finality the principle of ultimate
majority control, more specific constitutional and legal arguments may be
necessary to convince today’s majority to assert its rights, and to persuade the
country to support that effort.
I argue that there is support in the plain language of the Constitution
for the principle of ultimate majority control, namely the language of Article
I, Section 5 providing that “[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings.”72  This provision was probably viewed as routine and non-con-
troversial by the members of the Convention, since it stimulated little discus-
sion.  But it has exerted a strong force for the autonomy of the House and
Senate in the years since.  The Rulemaking Clause may be seen to have sev-
eral facets.73  First, it is a component of separation of powers, making it clear
that the president and the courts may not interfere with the internal work-
ings of the legislative branch.  Such interference has not, in fact, occurred.
67 See generally Ezra Klein, A Great Day for the Filibuster, and for Filibuster Reform, WASH.
POST BLOG (Mar. 6, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2013/03/06/a-great-day-for-the-filibuster-and-for-filibuster-reform/ (detailing the
democrats current push for filibuster reform as the republicans filibuster during John
Brennan’s nomination to lead the CIA).
68 See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 24, at 70–74; SENATE CLOTURE RULE, supra note 29, R
at 48–70.  Even Senator Robert Byrd, the ultimate traditionalist, finally supported the idea
of a simple majority to change the rules during the effort to tighten post-cloture procedure
in 1979. See Shapiro, supra note 34, at 228–32. R
69 The three Vice Presidents are Nixon in 1957, Humphrey in 1969, and Rockefeller in
1975. See Gold & Gupta, supra note 65, at 247–60. R
70 See, e.g., id. at 208; Wawro & Schickler, supra note 10, at 299. R
71 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. R
72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
73 I have earlier explored this contention in more detail. See John C. Roberts, Are
Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the Enact-
ment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 528–42 (2001); Roberts, supra note 16, at 531–39. R
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Second, it ensures the power of each house of Congress to determine its own
rules unhampered by the other house.  This also has been non-controversial.
Third, and most importantly for our purposes, it articulates a fundamental
principle of continuing legislative autonomy, that each group of legislators in
successive Congresses has the power to determine its own rules of procedure.
In that sense, this third facet of the Rulemaking Clause is an application of
the anti-entrenchment principle—that no current group of legislators may
bind future groups to follow its ideas of correct policy or procedure.74
Some have argued that the Rulemaking Clause only means that the
House cannot interfere with Senate procedures, and vice versa.  To answer
that point we need to consider who may invoke the Rulemaking Clause to
make or amend procedural rules.  Certainly the initial group of senators con-
vening in 1789 could, and in fact they adopted by majority vote rules to gov-
ern the legislative process.75  But a moment’s reflection leads to the
conclusion that all future groups of senators must also possess the power con-
ferred by the Rulemaking Clause.  If that were not the case, the first Senate
could have adopted rules which could only be changed by unanimous con-
sent, or which could not be changed at all.  In that case all succeeding Sen-
ates would be unable to adopt new or modified rules of procedure, and the
explicit language of the Constitution would be nullified.  Does the first Sen-
ate possess the power to amend the Constitution in this way?  Can the
Rulemaking Clause be used to nullify itself?  Logic would seem to compel a
negative answer.
This continuous power interpretation of the Rulemaking Clause has in
fact been articulated throughout our history.  Early commentators on the
Constitution interpreted it this way.76  The Supreme Court and the courts of
appeals have many times affirmed the power of each successive House and
Senate to adopt its own rules.77  And, not surprisingly, the House and Senate
themselves have asserted from the beginning the right of each successive
Congress to determine its own rules.78  When it adopts rules statutes purport-
ing to limit the bodies procedurally, Congress often includes boilerplate lan-
guage specifying that such provisions do not bind future majorities in the
House and Senate.79  For practical reasons, of course, any attempt by the
74 See John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A
Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773 (2003) (arguing anti-entrench-
ment is a well-established constitutional norm).
75 Gold & Gupta, supra note 65, at 207. R
76 See, e.g., 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 298 (1833) (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1970).
77 See, e.g., U.S. v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892) (“The power to make rules is not one
which once exercised is exhausted.  It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised
by the house . . . .”); Metzenbaum v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 675 F.2d 1282, 1288
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
78 See WM. HOLMES BROWN & CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE 162–63 (2003);
RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 22, at 1217–27. R
79 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107-139, at 54 (Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of
2002) (“[Disclaimer recognizes that procedures for a disapproval resolution] are enacted
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Senate to adopt a procedural rule which could not be changed would simply
be ignored by future Senates, and there would be no way of enforcing the
earlier Senate’s wishes.
We might next ask ourselves: What vote is required for the exercise of
the rulemaking power?  Some scholars have argued that supermajority rules
are themselves exercises of the rulemaking power and are thus constitution-
ally valid.80  But again, further analysis eliminates that option.  If, as propo-
nents of the constitutionality of Rule XXII rule entrenchment argue, a
majority may adopt a supermajority rule that binds future majorities, then it
may also adopt un-amendable rules.  If such a power over rules exists, there is
no stopping point as among a two-thirds requirement, a four-fifths require-
ment, unanimity, and un-amendability, which would deprive future Senates
of their rulemaking power.  The only logical stopping point is a simple major-
ity vote.  Remember that the Senate’s initial rules package in 1789 was
adopted by majority vote, and in fact the Senate’s rules and procedures still
provide that the Rules can be amended by majority vote, in line with its posi-
tion on the continuing rulemaking power.81  It is the anomaly of Rule XXII’s
requirement that a two-thirds vote is required to close debate on a proposal
to change Standing Rules that violates the Rulemaking Clause.
A third basis for my argument that rule entrenchment is inconsistent
with our legal and constitutional tradition is that it violates the anti-entrench-
ment principle universally recognized as governing the operation of legisla-
tive bodies.  Stated simply, the anti-entrenchment norm is simply that no
legislative body may act to control the legislative outcomes of future groups
of legislators.  At one level, it is simply a common sense notion that stems
naturally from the basic concept of representative self-government.  New
groups of legislators, elected by voters with new ideas about public policy,
cannot be restrained by decisions made in the past when political, social, or
economic conditions were different.  The anti-entrenchment norm does not
appear in our Constitution, but it has been a mostly unquestioned part of our
legislative jurisprudence for hundreds of years.82  As argued above, it finds
procedural expression in the Constitution’s Rulemaking Clause.  Entrench-
ment would also seem to conflict with the thrust of Article I’s delegation of
all legislative power to the Congress, since a subsequent Congress faced with
a “binding” un-repealable statute would clearly have its legislative power
impaired.
Substantive entrenchment—the enacting of ordinary laws which cannot
be amended or repealed—has never been attempted in the American Con-
pursuant to the rule-making powers of the House of Representatives and the Senate.  It
further recognizes the constitutional right of either House to change its rules at any
time.”).
80 See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COM-
MENT. 445, 450–51 (2004).
81 RIDDICK, supra note 22, at 1217. R
82 For further discussion of this principle, see ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 520–47, and R
Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 74. R
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gress, or in any other legislative body that I know of.  Practically speaking,
since there is no enforcement mechanism available to hold a future majority
to the decisions of a past majority, no Congress would allow its legislative
prerogatives to be restricted in such a situation.  I have written at length
about both the policy arguments and legal justifications for the anti-
entrenchment principle and do not intend to repeat them here.83  Suffice it
to say that with a few recent scholarly exceptions, none of our Founding
Fathers, contemporary commentators, federal judges or congressional lead-
ers have ever questioned it.  Charles Black once called it an idea which is “on
the most familiar and fundamental principles, so obvious as rarely to be
stated.”84
The only examples we have of legislative entrenchment are procedural.
Rule XXII is the most important one, but the Senate has occasionally added
special sixty-vote requirements to legislation.  Several are scattered about in
the Budget Act to require a supermajority to waive points of order,85 but
these are really backup versions of the basic cloture requirement of Rule
XXII.  Occasionally Congress has passed laws that contain other kinds of pro-
cedural provisions that purport to restrict future Congresses.  When the
future arrives, Congress usually ignores such provisions, and the federal
courts have refused to intervene.86  Nevertheless, some commentators have
conceded that substantive entrenchment is beyond the pale but argued that
entrenchment of procedural rules, as in Rule XXII, is different and permissi-
ble.87  That distinction is an illusion.  If anything, procedural entrenchment
is more of a threat to representative self-government than substantive
entrenchment, since it can have a vastly greater effect on legislative discre-
tion.  Anyone who has worked in a legislative body knows that many impor-
tant substantive matters are disposed of on procedural motions.  The
legislation in question is just as dead as if it had been defeated on an up-or-
down vote.  Veteran legislators have often pointed out that controlling a
chamber’s procedures is in the end more powerful than controlling its sub-
stantive policy choices.88  Moreover, it is not easy to characterize particular
83 See Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 74. R
84 Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J.
189, 191 (1972).
85 See, e.g., Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-
344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–688 (2006)).
86 See, e.g., Metzenbaum v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 675 F.2d. 1282 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (holding that the claim was not suitable for judicial review as resolution of the issue
would require the court to construe the rules of the House and to impose upon the House
the court’s interpretations of its rules).
87 See, e.g., Virginia A. Seitz & Joseph R. Guerra, A Constitutional Defense of “Entrenched”
Senate Rules Governing Debate, 20 J.L. & POL. 1 (2004) (agreeing with the anti-entrenchment
norm broadly construed, but arguing in support of the validity of supermajority rules).
88 Walter Oleszek quotes veteran congressman John Dingell as declaring that “if you
let me write the procedure, and I let you write the substance, I’ll [beat] you every time.”
WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS, CONG. RES.
SERV. 12 (2007).
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devices as substantive or procedural.  In the Senate, a motion to proceed to a
matter, a motion to table, or a motion to recommit are in reality motions on
the merits.89  Is a hypothetical rule providing that a four-fifths vote is
required to close debate on any bill raising income tax rates substantive or
procedural?  The example illustrates that procedural entrenchment could
theoretically be used to foreclose action in an entire area of substantive pol-
icy and thus is just as much a violation of the entrenchment principle as
substantive entrenchment.
In the end, there is ample justification in our jurisprudence, including
explicit constitutional language, to support a determined majority’s argu-
ment that a simple majority vote can be used to adopt new Senate rules at any
time.  Reform-minded senators are not violating the constitutional provisions
creating the Senate or any other types of legal norms when they assert that
power.  To the contrary, it is the specific provision of Rule XXII requiring a
two-thirds vote to end debate on a proposal to change Senate rules that is
inconsistent with our legal and constitutional tradition.
THE CONTINUING BODY ARGUMENT
The principal defense to arguments that rule entrenchment in Rule
XXII violates both the Rulemaking Clause and the anti-entrenchment princi-
ple is that the Senate is a continuing body, and therefore there is no “future
Senate” to bind.90  On its face the continuing body argument sounds almost
frivolous—can it really be that easy to avoid the dire consequences of
entrenchment, just by declaring that there has been only one Senate since
1789?  A more specific response begins with the observation that virtually all
Western legislative bodies abide by the rule that a simple majority can adopt
new procedural rules after an election, if not at any time.91  The continuing
body theory as an argumentative tool was unknown in the early American
Senate and seems not to have been advanced until 1841.  The Senate, unlike
the House, did consider its Standing Rules to be continuous from the begin-
ning, in the sense that they were in effect until changed.  But there was no
assertion of a supermajority requirement to modify or repeal standing rules.
Motions to change the rules could be filibustered like any others, but then as
now the actual vote required to change the rules was a simple majority.92
When the cloture rule was adopted in 1917, it did not apply to motions to
change the rules.  The 1949 amendments to broaden cloture still left it
unavailable on rules changes.  Entrenchment of the Standing Rules stems
from the 1959 compromise, when Rule V was added asserting that the Senate
was a continuing body and that rules remained in effect until changed as
89 See id. 12–13.
90 See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 80, at 464–65. R
91 Senator Walsh, during the 1917 cloture rule debate, noted that the idea of majority
control over rules was “universal among . . . American legislatures.”  Gold & Gupta, supra
note 65, at 223. R
92 See id. at 217–27.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL507.txt unknown Seq: 18  2-JUL-13 12:21
2206 notre dame law review [vol. 88:5
provided by the rules themselves.  This linked the continuing body notion
with the part of Rule XXII that required a two-thirds majority to end debate
on changes in the Standing Rules.  Since the notion of continuity can simply
mean that rules continue unless the majority decides to change them, the
real entrenchment culprit is Rule XXII, not Rule V.93
Is the Senate really continuous, and if so in what way?  In some larger
sense all of the entities created by the Constitution are continuous in that
they are created by the founding document independent of the men and
women who serve on them—that is why we often speak of “the Presidency” or
“the Senate” with a broader historical meaning.  Advocates of the continuing
body theory seize on the fact that only one-third of the Senate is elected every
two years as proving that there is never a new Senate.94  A majority of sena-
tors constitutes a quorum, they say, and the same quorum remains through
each election.95  There are several responses to this highly formalistic argu-
ment.  First, it doesn’t distinguish the Senate from the House, which has
never asserted that it is a continuing body.  In terms of actual continuity of
membership, the House is sometimes more continuous than the Senate,
since a high percentage of House members are reelected each cycle.  And
House members’ terms expire only at the moment when new members are
sworn in, so the House quorum is also continuous in fact.96  Second, arguing
that the Senate after each election is “the same” Senate flies in the face of
common sense.  Over time we know that the makeup of the Senate can
change dramatically; is today’s Senate the same parliamentary body as it was
in the 1950s, when seniority was inviolable and Southern Democrats with per-
manent seats controlled the body?  We also must acknowledge that on the
frequent occasions when control changes in an election the result is different
majority leadership, different officers, different committee chairs, and many
new staff members, to mention just the obvious changes.  Depending on the
election, the body might have a radically different policy agenda as well.
Such drastic changes can even take place even without a change in control, if
the views of a majority of senators, some newly elected and some continuing,
change because of economic conditions, the mood of the country, or foreign
threats.  It seems silly to assert that the Senate is always the same when such
radical shifts can and do occur.
Moreover, the Senate itself does not always act in ways consistent with
the continuing body theory.  As Professor Bruhl has pointed out, there are
many non-continuous aspects of Senate rules and practices.97  All senators
refer to “the 112th Congress” as do committee reports and other Senate doc-
uments.  On the most important legislative issue of all—the status of pending
93 On the history of changes to Rule XXII, see SENATE CLOTURE RULE, supra note 29, R
at 11–41.
94 See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 80, at 464–65. R
95 Id. at 465.
96 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
97 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of the Senate, 95
IOWA L. REV. 1401, 1444–56 (2010).
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bills and nominations—the Senate is decidedly not continuous.  All bills and
nominations not disposed of by the end of a Congress disappear and have to
be reintroduced.98  All numbering of bills and other business starts over.99
And in other ways the Senate does not always act in accordance with the
continuing body theory.  It doesn’t always treat its chair rulings and informal
practices as binding, and in fact frequently ignores them or sees them
changed by new rulings of the Chair.100  As we have noted, the Senate often
refuses to enforce statutory procedural rules, explicitly arguing that it is not
bound by them because of the continuing power of the Rulemaking Clause.
It is no exaggeration to say that the Senate does not recognize any kind of
rule entrenchment with the exception of Rule XXII.  Is it logical to argue
that the Senate is a continuing body only for the purpose of entrenching its
Standing Rules?  What is the constitutional basis for such an assertion?
The real problem with the idea that the Senate is a continuing body is
that it proves too much.  Advocates of this response to the Rulemaking
Clause and anti-entrenchment critiques never explain why simply observing
that the Senate thinks it is a continuing body can explain the far reaching
legal and policy effects.  Taken seriously, the one-Senate theory would allow a
simple majority of members at its first meeting in 1789 to adopt un-amenda-
ble rules, or rules amendable only by unanimous consent.  The Rulemaking
Clause and the anti-entrenchment principle rest on profound truths about
representative democracy and popular sovereignty.  How can these funda-
mental tenets be overborne by the simple assertion that the Senate is contin-
uous?  And even if one were to agree that there is only one continuous
Senate since 1789, that doesn’t explain why that Senate has the power, in the
face of the Rulemaking Clause and the anti-entrenchment principle, to bind
itself in the future.  Both principles are violated by Rule XXII rule entrench-
ment even if the Senate is a continuing body.  Rule V and Rule XXII cannot
be used to amend or abrogate the Rulemaking Clause of the Constitution,
particularly since there is no support for the continuing body theory in the
language of the Constitution.
In truth, the continuing body theory is a political device of recent origin
developed to further placate opponents of loosening cloture rules.  It is not
rooted in any specific constitutional language.  Its basis is vague and confus-
ing, and it is inconsistent with the rest of Senate practice.  As I have argued,
the rule entrenchment part of Rule XXII should be exposed as unconstitu-
tional, majority control should be restored, and Rule V should be considered
only a statement that Senate Standing Rules continue in force until changed
by simple majority vote.
98 See id. at 1447 & n.159.
99 See id.
100 See id. at 1440–41.
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REFORMING THE FILIBUSTER
Let us now assume that a majority of senators accepts my argument that
underlying principles of majority rule, the constitutional rulemaking power,
and the venerable anti-entrenchment principle, provide sufficient justifica-
tion for the assertion of ultimate majority control.  What should the majority
do?  The parliamentary battles from the 1960s on have demonstrated that the
Senate as a whole does not wish to simply abolish extended debate.  The
traditions of the Senate are simply too powerful, and the value of the filibus-
ter as a device to ensure consensus and protect intensely-held minority views
is clear to both parties.  Moreover, there is force to the argument that the
Senate’s role of ensuring lengthier consideration of important issues than
the House is important in a bicameral system.  To be successful, a majority
today needs to abandon the goal of abolition.  It must make the rhetorical
case that ultimate majority control is constitutionally required and that the
Senate needs to return to the core values of the filibuster.  The goals of
reform should be to re-establish the filibuster as an instrument of extended
debate, not knee-jerk obstruction, to confine the filibuster to issues of real
importance, and to streamline the procedural aspects of cloture.  In short,
the Standing Rules must be changed to recognize that the old consensus
controls of restraint and cooperation that kept the filibuster weapon from
destroying the Senate’s work are no longer functioning.  Moreover, to be
successful, changes must be balanced, curbing some of the excesses of the
majority that have been employed to control filibustering.  These changes
could be accomplished while retaining the current sixty-vote cloture require-
ment, which many in and out of the Senate see as important.
The debate in early 2011 over proposals to reform filibusters and holds
is instructive.  A variety of reform resolutions was introduced, but no one
advocated complete abolition of the filibuster.101  The Harkin proposal for
reducing the vote necessary for cloture over time came the closest, and it had
little support.102  The debate was about various devices to reform the hold,
which of course is closely related to the filibuster.  In order to avoid the need
for a two-thirds vote under Rule XXII, most of the changes were adopted as
Standing Orders, which were subject to the sixty-vote requirement for cloture
if filibustered.  Some of the reformers asserted that a simple majority had the
right to adopt new rules at the beginning of a new Congress, and their oppo-
nents did not argue that such a course would be unconstitutional; the argu-
ments centered on the value of the filibuster and the need to protect it on
the merits.103  The debate suggested that a majority may exist for some types
of filibuster reform.
101 121 CONG. REC. S295–S348 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2011) (discussing amending the
Standing Rules of the Senate).
102 His proposal, S. Res. 8, 112th Cong. (2011), was defeated by a vote of 84 to 12.  157
CONG. REC. S327 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2011).
103 See generally David Sarasohn, Taking on the Filibuster Starts a Long Conversation,
OREGONLIVE (Jan. 29, 2011, 5:32 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/
david_sarasohn/index.ssf/2011/01/taking_on_the_filibuster_start.html (discussing the
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One proposal often advanced by filibuster reformers would be to restrict
the filibuster to final passage of a measure, while retaining the current sixty-
vote cloture requirement.104  Most filibusters and holds on legislation today
are centered on the parliamentary devices necessary to make a bill the pend-
ing business of the Senate.105  It is for this reason that many see the modern
filibuster as the exact opposite of extended debate, since real or threatened
filibusters that block consideration of a bill prevent any discussion of the
measure.106  Restricting filibusters to the vote on final passage would ensure
that on measures of real importance there could still be extended debate,
and would have the added advantage of exposing the issues to the public,
perhaps increasing pressure on those mounting the filibuster.  Eliminating
filibusters on taking up a bill would have the added benefit of reducing holds
on bills, since the purpose of the hold is often to prevent the majority from
being able to debate the bill and build public support for it.107  To foreclose
another obstructive tactic, the rules should also be changed to abolish filibus-
ters on the procedural motions necessary to send a passed bill to conference
with the House, allowing a filibuster only on final passage of the Conference
Report.  Thus the six filibusters allowed on each measure under current prac-
tice would be reduced to two.
Returning the filibuster to its classical roots could also be advanced by
changes in the rules to actually require extended debate.  Today, as we have
noted, there are actually very few “talking filibusters,” since the Senate over
time has allowed merely the suggesting of a possible filibuster on a measure,
usually through a hold or an objection to a unanimous consent agreement,
to end consideration of a bill before it begins.108  If the rules required that
those engaging in a filibuster at the time of final passage actually be present
on the floor to conduct debate (by standing at their desks, as Senate rules
require), it would raise the burden on the minority and make it easier to
obtain the sixty votes needed to close debate.109  Along the same lines, the
Senate could adopt the suggestion made by reformers from time to time that
the quorum call procedure after cloture has been filed be modified to make
Senate’s rejection of the proposed plan as the only place in America where “the word
‘constitutional’ was [not] an unstoppable trump card”).
104 See Leigh Ann Caldwell, Senate Approves Modest Restrictions on Filibusters, CBS NEWS
(Jan. 24, 2013, 9:39 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-34222_162-57565736-10391739/
senate-approves-modest-restrictions-on-filibusters/ (explaining the Senate passed a bill to
curb filibusters).
105 RICHARD S. BETH & VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, FILIBUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE,




108 See Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003,
1009–10  (2011).
109 This was among the reform proposals by Senators Udall, Harkin, and Merkley that
were defeated in January 2011. See S. Res. 21, 112th Cong. (2011) (defeated by a vote of
forty-nine to forty-six); 157 CONG. REC. S328 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2011).
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the filibuster more difficult to sustain.110  In the classical filibuster, the major-
ity must keep its fifty-one votes constantly available in case of quorum calls,
while the minority only needs one senator on the floor at a time to maintain
the filibuster.  It is an unequal contest.  If the Standing Rules were changed
to require that the minority show the presence of its forty-one votes each
time a quorum call is made, it would vastly increase the difficulty of maintain-
ing the filibuster.  It seems only fair, again referring to the supposed purpose
of the filibuster, to put the onus on the minority to continuously demonstrate
its strength or lose the floor.  Finally, if reformers really wanted to increase
the pain involved in filibustering, so as to make it less common, they could
eliminate the “two-track” system, which allows a filibuster to continue while
other necessary action on other measures is taken.111  This would involve
enforcing the principle that once a filibuster started no other business could
be conducted.
It has to be recognized that some of the reforms outlined above could
dramatically slow down the business of the Senate when the minority
attempts to filibuster.  But by making it harder and more painful for the
minority to filibuster, the rules might well make it much less common.  At
any rate, since Senate business is often obstructed now by the one-person
stealth filibuster, it is hard to see how the situation could get much worse.  As
noted above, the slowing of Senate business is balanced by the increased pub-
lic visibility for the issues being debated.
An alternative approach might be to change the rules to restrict the
kinds of matters that could be filibustered.  Both parties have at times advo-
cated eliminating filibusters on executive and judicial nominations, for exam-
ple, a topic I have chosen not to address specifically in this paper.112  The
filibuster’s effect could also be reduced by the use of more so-called rules
statutes, exempting certain kinds of bills from the tradition of extended
debate.  The Senate could today, as we have noted, carve out more exemp-
tions from Rule XXII as it has for the reconciliation process, but it would be
difficult to find consensus on the kinds of bills that deserve such favored
treatment.  In addition, the more attention is focused on the fact that such
statutes are really changes in the Senate’s rules, the more opposition there
would be to expanding this category.
Another useful set of reforms might center on post-cloture procedure.
Tightening the specific rules governing the current requirement of thirty
110 This device was recommended by, among others, Mann and Ornstein in their
recent book. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 168–69. R
111 The two-track system was instituted by the Democratic leadership in the early 1970s.
OLESZEK, supra note 89, at 212. R
112 See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, Judicial Nomination Filibuster Cause and Cure, 2005 UTAH L.
REV. 803, 860 (discussing the unconstitutionality of “the current filibuster campaign
against majority-supported judicial nominations”).
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hours of debate after cloture has actually been achieved could significantly
reduce the actual time needed to get a vote on final passage.113
Some progress was made in 2011 to address the abusive use of holds, but
the results have been limited.114  The use of holds in recent years perfectly
exemplifies the procedurally fragile Senate.  In a Senate which actually oper-
ated under its original culture, which emphasized personal relationships,
courtesy, and respect for each member, the hold would be infrequent and
based on a legitimate institutional concern.  What started as a courtesy
extended to each member, however, has developed into a potent weapon of
individual veto, all without any basis in the Standing Rules.  A determined
Majority Leader could put an end to abusive holds tomorrow.  The 2011
reforms centered on transparency, to avoid secret holds, and on time lim-
its.115  Both changes try to eliminate holds that actually have nothing to do
with the merits of the measure in question and ensure that the hold’s effect
on the substantive bill is purely temporary.  Unfortunately, enforcement has
been lacking, and members have found ways around the new rules.116  Like
the filibuster, the hold is too potent a weapon in the current Senate for mem-
bers to easily give it up.
As noted above, reforms in the filibuster and the cloture rule to tip the
scales of action more toward the majority might have the salutary effect of
reducing some of the tactics used by the majority to overcome obstruction,
such as routine early filing of cloture motions and restricting minority
amendments.117  To increase support among members for significant
reform, the Rules should be changed to modify the Senate’s ubiquitous
unanimous consent procedure to provide greater protection for the minor-
ity’s historic right to offer amendments.  Changes that balance limits on fili-
bustering with increased protection for minorities in other areas have the
potential to ratchet down polarization and partisan recrimination.  They also
have a better chance of garnering public support for change.
113 For example, splitting the thirty hours between the majority and the minority, so
that advocates of the bill could waive their time, or reducing drastically the overall time
limit for debate after cloture.
114 See Carl Hulse, Senate Approves Changes Intended to Ease Gridlock, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2011, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/us/politics/28cong.html.
(“[T]he Senate approved other changes . . . in rules intended to quicken the pace of
action, including new limits on a single lawmaker’s ability to anonymously block legislation
and nominations.”).
115 S. Res. 21, 112th Cong. (2011).
116 See, e.g., Melanie Sloan, Sloan: Secret Holds Are Filibuster’s Silent Partner in Stalling,
ROLL CALL (Jan. 23, 2013, 5:24 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/sloan_secret_holds_
are_filibusters_silent_partner_in_stalling-221053-1.html. (“[S]enators continue to employ
secret holds to anonymously stall, and at times kill, crucial nominations and legislation.
Over the past three years, there have been only 20 instances of a ‘notice of intent to object’
placed in the Senate Calendar of Business—more than half by [Senators] Grassley and
Wyden—but secret holds appear to have been placed on numerous other bills and nomi-
nations contrary to the agreed-upon rule.”).
117 See supra Part II.
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Defenders of the status quo may argue that accepting the right of each
Senate to control its rules by simple majority vote would lead to instability
and chaos.  Presumably they are concerned that there might be wild swings
in Senate procedure, which would adversely affect the legislative process.  It
is hard to square this argument with history or common sense.  The House,
like virtually all other legislative bodies, has the power to change its rules
after each election, and there is no evidence that chaos has been the
result.118  On a few occasions (1995 and 2011 come to mind) it has taken
significant steps to enhance majority control after a big electoral shift, but
usually only modest changes are made after each election.119  And remember
that Rule V ensures that the Senate’s rules would continue in force until
changed by the majority, obviating the concern that there would be no rules
to govern procedure at the beginning of a Congress.  Given the stubborn
resistance to rules changes over its history, it is difficult to imagine that even
after the principle of ultimate majority control is finally confirmed, the Sen-
ate would be prone to constant tinkering.  Everything we know about the
Senate tells us that it will always be slow to adopt major rules changes and will
always protect minority rights.  Finally, making it easier to change the rules
can hardly be more threatening to the regular order than the Senate’s long-
established practice of ignoring its rules and procedures routinely through
Unanimous Consent Agreements.  It is ironic indeed that we should be
debating the power to change the Senate’s rules in the context of the Sen-
ate’s long history of extremely informal floor practice.
CONCLUSION
As I noted at the outset, the goal of a more functional Senate cannot be
attained without political change—less polarization and greater willingness
to cooperate across party lines.  It may not be attainable without stronger
leadership, like that provided by Lyndon Johnson in the 1950s or the combi-
nation of Robert Byrd and Howard Baker in the 1970s.  Because of the Sen-
ate’s unusual susceptibility to minority obstruction, however, rules reform
can play a role in restoring its ability to legislate effectively.  A more reasona-
ble balance between majority rights and minority prerogatives is clearly
required, and for that to happen, ultimate majority control must be reas-
serted.  Each party supports this principle when it is in the majority, and
since party control has changed four times in the past eighteen years, even
the current minority party should recognize that reform will be in its ultimate
best interests.
118 See Committee on Rules: A History, U.S. H.R. COMMITTEE ON RULES DEM., http://demo-
crats.rules.house.gov/110/comm_history.html (providing a brief history of the Committee
on Rules).
119 See, e.g., MICHAEL L KOEMPEL & JUDY SCHNEIDER, A RETROSPECTIVE OF HOUSE RULES
CHANGES SINCE THE 110TH CONGRESS, CONG. RES. SERV. (2012), available at http://
assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R42395_20120307.pdf (cataloging several categories of rules
changes since the 110th Congress).
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This paper has argued that ultimate majority control has ample justifica-
tion in the Constitution and our broader legal tradition of democratic self-
government.  The principle had been successfully vindicated in the past
through mutual restraint, parliamentary deterrence, and chair rulings, but
those weapons have proven too weak in today’s caustic political atmosphere.
Aided by a sympathetic chair willing to make the appropriate rulings, a deter-
mined Majority Leader and a united majority should first assert its constitu-
tional right to control its rules and then embark on sensible reforms that
preserve the right of filibuster while imposing discipline on its exercise.  The
Senate must be willing to change some of its time honored traditions in
order to adapt to the polarized political world of the twenty-first century,
while preserving the core values that make it a unique legislative body.
POSTSCRIPT
Two developments following the Symposium and while this paper was
being prepared for publication deserve brief notice.  First, the lawsuit
brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to declare that
the sixty-vote requirement of Rule XXII is unconstitutional and that cloture
could be invoked by simple majority vote was dismissed on December 21,
2012.120  Plaintiffs included Common Cause, four House members who
alleged that their vote for the DREAM Act was nullified by the inability of the
Senate to overcome the sixty-vote threshold, and three individuals who
argued that they would have benefitted from the DREAM Act had it been
enacted into law.121  Judge Emmet G. Sullivan found that none of the plain-
tiffs had standing.122  He went on to find that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under the political question doctrine.  Relying on separation of
powers principles and the Rulemaking Clause, he found that “it is for the
Senate, and not this Court, to determine the rules governing debate.”123
Second, significant efforts to modify the Senate’s filibuster and cloture
procedures were made at the start of the 113th Congress, supported by
reform groups and many editorial writers.  Soon after the election, Majority
Leader Reid announced that he would propose rules changes, using the con-
stitutional option if necessary.124  With a fifty-five to forty-five majority, he
had four parliamentary options.  If no senator objected he could try to
change Rule XXII with a simple majority vote.  Assuming that at least one
member would object, he could attempt to persuade Republicans to support
change and thus meet the required two-thirds voting requirement to end
120 Common Cause v. Biden, C.A. No. 12–775 (EGS), 2012 WL 6628951 (D.D.C. Dec.
21, 2012).
121 Id. at *1.
122 Id. at *8.
123 Id. at *17.
124 See, e.g., Lauren Fox, Filibuster Reform Takes Center Stage on First Day Back: Minority-
Empowering Tool Again in Senate Majority’s Crosshairs, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 26, 2012), http://
www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/11/26/filibuster-reform-takes-center-stage-on-first-
day-back.
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debate on rules changes under Rule XXII.  He could also propose changes in
the form of a Standing Order, which could have the effect of a rules change
but would require only sixty votes to close debate.  Finally, he could seek a
Chair ruling from Vice President Biden that a simple majority of senators
could close debate on a rules change at the beginning of a new Congress—
the constitutional option.  Many of the changes debated in January 2011
again surfaced, including elimination of the filibuster on a motion to pro-
ceed to a matter, the requirement of a talking filibuster and elimination of
filibusters on the motions necessary to go to conference with the House.125
A bipartisan group of senators who opposed the constitutional option, led by
Senators Carl Levin and John McCain, also proposed a compromise that
would make more limited changes to the debate rules.126
Despite Majority Leader Reid’s repeated statements that he was willing
to invoke the constitutional option, he ultimately entered into a compromise
with the minority that largely tracked the limited changes contained in the
Levin-McCain proposal.127  The two key measures pushed by reformers—
elimination of the filibuster on a motion to proceed to a bill and the require-
ment of a “talking filibuster”—were shelved.  Instead, the Senate agreed to a
new Standing Order, good only for the current Congress, that eliminates the
filibuster on a motion to proceed if the Majority Leader permits at least four
amendments, two from each side.128  If non-germane, they would be subject
to a sixty-vote requirement for adoption.  In addition, votes on most nomina-
tions would be expedited once cloture was obtained.129  The Standing Rules
were also amended, using a two-thirds vote threshold for adoption, to add a
new method of bringing up a bill.130  If the two leaders and seven members
from each side agree on a cloture motion, the procedure would be expe-
dited.  In addition, the three motions now required to go to conference with
the House would be collapsed into one, reducing the number of filibuster
opportunities.131  The leaders also announced an informal agreement to
address certain kinds of dilatory tactics during the post-cloture period.132
Given the widespread support for more far-reaching change among
Democrats and those outside Congress, this outcome represents a lost oppor-
tunity to address Senate gridlock.  The new rules may make business move
somewhat faster, but the power of the minority to obstruct is largely undimin-
125 See, e.g., S. Res. 4, 5, 6, & 7, 113th Cong. (2013).
126 See Alexander Bolton, Bipartisan Senate Group Supports Plan to Avoid ‘Nuclear Option’
in Filibuster Reform, THE HILL (Dec. 28, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/
senate/274823-bipartisan-group-of-senators-rallies-around-plan-to-avoid-nuclear-option.
127 See David Weigal, Fili-busted: Democrats Pull Back from the Nuclear Option on Filibuster
Reform.  Did They Get a Bum Deal?, SLATE (Jan. 24, 2013, 7:55 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/01/filibuster_reform_senate_democrats_com
promise_instead_of_forcing_the_nuclear.html.
128 S. Res. 15, 113th Cong. (2013).
129 Id.
130 S. Res. 16, 113th Cong. (2013).
131 Id.
132 For the full debate, see 159 CONG. REC. S247–S274 (daily ed., Jan. 24, 2013).
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ished.133  In the end, Senator Reid may have felt that he did not have a
majority in his party for the constitutional option, but also realized that using
it would provoke partisan rancor at a time when critical issues were before
the Senate.  Early reaction from commentators on the modest package of
changes ranged from muted praise to outrage.134
133 See Niels Lesniewski, Changes to Filibuster May Give Senate Leaders Political Heartburn,
ROLL CALL (Jan. 24, 2013, 7:33 PM) http://www.rollcall.com/news/changes_to_filibuster_
may_give_senate_leaders_political_heartburn-221106-1.html.
134 See, e.g., Editorial, Progress in the Senate, WASH. POST, Jan, 26, 2013, at A14, available at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-26/opinions/36562515_1_filibuster-senate-
floor-reid; see also Greg Sargent, No Price for Unprecedented Obstructionism and Destructive Gov-
ernance, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2013, 5:02 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
plum-line/wp/2013/01/24/no-price-for-unprecedented-obstructionism-and-destructive-
governance/. For an early balanced appraisal from a key congressional scholar, see Sarah
A. Binder, Take a Little, Give a Little: The Senate’s Effort at Filibuster Reform, BROOKINGS (Jan.
24, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/01/24-filibuster-reform-
binder.
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